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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)1 was 
expected to open doors for people with disabilities that had long been 
closed, the ADA is widely regarded as a disappointment, especially in 
the employment context, where absurd results are not uncommon.2 To 
bring a claim of employment discrimination under the ADA, a 
plaintiff must show “(1) he is disabled, (2) he is qualified to perform 
the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable 
accommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Ph.D. candidate, Indiana University Bloomington. 
1 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
2 See, e.g., Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 994-95 (citing a case in which a 
plaintiff suffering from schizophrenia was denied a job because the employer said 
she was “physically and mentally incapable of having a job,” yet lost her case for not 
being able to prove she was regarded as having a mental impairment); Alex B. Long, 
Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217-18 (2008) 
(relating a case in which a plaintiff with cancer brought suit against his employer and 
died before the resolution of the case, which posthumously found that the plaintiff’s 
cancer was not limiting enough to be considered a disability under the Act). 
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because of his disability.”3 Intuitively, one might suspect it would be 
the third prong of the definition—proving that he suffered an adverse 
employment action because of his disability—that that would be a 
challenge for a plaintiff. However, contrary to expectations, and 
contrary to past practice, it is the first prong, whether a plaintiff has a 
disability under the law, which has proved challenging.4 Time and 
time again, individuals with a wide range of serious impairments—
from epilepsy to diabetes to cancer—have not met the statutory 
definition of “disability.”5 And in case after case, the courts have 
narrowed their interpretation of the ADA, applying stringent 
requirements in order for plaintiffs to be considered disabled. Indeed, 
legal commentators have concluded that what was once celebrated as 
“the most comprehensive civil rights legislation passed by Congress 
since the 1964 Civil Rights Act” has become increasingly narrowed to 
the point of being in danger of becoming ineffective.6 How did the 
interpretation of the ADA move so far from its original intent? And 
what can be done about it?  
On July 26, 2007, the 17th anniversary of the ADA’s passage, 
legislation to amend the ADA was introduced in the House7 and 
Senate,8 resulting in the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments 
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”),9 a compromise bill negotiated between 
business10 and disability groups.11 The broad purpose of the ADAAA 
                                                 
3 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
4 Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139 (2000).   
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007-2008).  
8 Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2007, S. 1881, 110th 
Cong. (2007-2008).  
9 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
[hereinafter ADAAA of 2008].  
10 Business groups included U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Society for Human 
Resource Management, and National Association of Manufacturers.  
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was “[t]o restore the intent and protections of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.”12 Rejecting the reasoning and standards 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases over the last 
ten years13 and calling for the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”)14 to revise its regulations,15 Congress 
intended the ADAAA to reinstate a broad scope of protection for 
people with disabilities.16 The ADAAA starts off with the same 
definition of “disability” found in the original ADA, requiring (a) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of an individual, (b) a record of such an 
impairment, or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment.17 
                                                                                                                   
11 Disability groups included Epilepsy Foundation, American Diabetes 
Association, American Association of People with Disabilities, and National 
Disability Rights Network.  
12 ADAAA of 2008. 
13 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded 
by statute, ADAAA of 2008 (holding that whether an impairment substantially limits 
a major life activity is to be determined by taking into account the ameliorative 
effects of mitigating measures); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 
(1999) (declaring that the mitigating measures rule applied not just to artificial 
measures, but also to “measure undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the 
body’s own systems”); Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADAAA of 2008 (creating demanding standards for the terms 
“substantially” and “major” in the definition of disability and holding that to be 
substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA, “an 
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual 
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”).   
14 Congress has charged the EEOC with enforcing the ADA. 
15 Congress expects that the EEOC will revise the term “substantially limits,” 
as defined in its current regulations to mean “significantly restricted,” to be 
consistent with the ADAAA. ADAAA of 2008 § (2)(b)(6). 
16 ADAAA of 2008 § (2)(a)(1). 
17 (1) DISABILITY.—The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an 
individual— 
 (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities of such individual;  
  (B) a record of such an impairment; or  
  (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. . .  
ADAAA of 2008 § 3. 
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However, the amendments then make important revisions, including 
instructions to the courts regarding how the terms of the Act should be 
interpreted, clarifications to the “substantially limits” language, 
expansion of the “major life activities” concept, and substantial 
changes to the “regarded as” prong.18 According to the EEOC, “[t]he 
effect of these changes is to make it easier for an individual seeking 
protection under the ADA to establish that he or she has a disability 
within the meani 19ng of the ADA.”  
                                                
Just three months before the ADAAA went into effect,20 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
summary judgment in a controversial case involving an alleged ADA 
violation for refusing to hire an applicant because she was human 
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) positive.21 The Seventh Circuit’s 
majority decision in EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc. calls into question 
the court’s approach to ADA cases involving complex disabilities, 
such as HIV/AIDS. It also points to the disjuncture between ADA 
language and ADA litigation, “between the type of people that 
advocates of the ADA presumed would be covered under the law, and 
the practical reality of the protection currently afforded by the law.”22   
 Because very few cases have been decided yet under the 
ADAAA,23 it is uncertain if the new amendments will close the gap 
between Congress’ vision of protecting people with disabilities and the 
 
18 Long, supra note 2, at 218.  
19 THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NOTICE 
CONCERNING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) AMENDMENTS ACT 
OF 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/amendments_notice.html (page last modified 
March 10, 2009).  
20 The ADAAA was effective as of January 1, 2009. 
21 EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438 (7th Cir. 2008). 
22 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 156. 
23 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 2009 WL 331638 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that because the suit for injunctive relief was pending on appeal 
when the amendments became effective, the amendments apply to the case); but see, 
e.g., Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 
(9th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether the ADAAA applies retroactively and 
holding that even under pre-ADAAA case law, the plaintiff provided sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment).  
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interpretation of that vision promulgated by the courts and 
administrative agencies. Nonetheless, this note suggests that rather 
than attempting to distinguish those with disabilities from those 
without under the ADA or its amendments, a better policy approach 
would be to adopt an overly inclusive conceptualization of disability, 
one that captures all individuals in a broad spectrum of disability. 
While this concept of disability would technically include a number of 
individuals who might never need the ADA’s anti-discrimination 
protection, the concept would mirror Title VII, which similarly 
provides protection for many people who might never need its 
protection. Such an approach would allow the courts to expend less 
energy on parsing the definition of disability and deciding who is 
covered and more energy on remedying real cases of discrimination 
and dismissing others on the basis of their lack of merit.24 
 
II.  LEE’S LOG CABIN 
 
A.  Korrin’s Story 
 
Korrin Krause Stewart was diagnosed with HIV when she was 
14 years old.25 One week after Korrin’s initial diagnosis, she found out 
her HIV condition had already developed into acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (“AIDS”).26 In fact, Korrin had had HIV 
since birth because her mother, who died when Korrin was nine years 
old, was infected with the virus when Korrin was born.27  
                                                 
24 This concept of a spectrum of disabilities is not new.  Similar language and 
concepts were proposed in a report from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 
1983 and, more recently, in the work of legal commentator Chai R. Feldblum. See 
Feldblum, supra note 4.  
25 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *2, EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, No. 06-3278 
(7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2006).  
26 Id. 
27 Marilyn Marchione, Fears Over HIV Cost Girl Her Job; EEOC Urges 
Settlement, Finds ‘Reasonable Cause,’ MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Sep. 2, 2001, at 19, 21; 
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 25, at *2. 
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When Korrin was 15 years old, she worked as a part-time 
bagger and stock person at Quality Foods, a grocery store.28 She told a 
store manager that she had HIV when she was hired, and the manager 
told Korrin that the store would be able to accommodate her if she 
needed time off for appointments with her physicians.29 About a 
month later, Quality Foods’ upper management found out that Korrin 
was infected with HIV.30 The grocery store fired Korrin because she 
was HIV positive, and the EEOC settled a lawsuit against Quality 
Foods for unlawful employment practices, violative of the ADA.31   
Just a couple of years later, when Korrin was 18 years old, she 
responded to an advertisement in the Wausaw Daily Herald for a 
waitress position at Lee’s Log Cabin Restaurant (“Log Cabin”).32 
Although Korrin had never been a waitress before, she had lots of 
other restaurant experience, as a bartender, cashier, dishwasher and 
server, which she put down on her application.33 Also, since one of the 
job requirements was that a waitress be able to lift 25-30 pounds 
during a shift, she stated on her application that she had a lifting 
restriction of 10 pounds that could not be accommodated.34 Just two 
weeks before applying for this job, Korrin’s doctor had put Korrin on 
a lifting restriction until her platelet count increased.35  The assistant 
manager she spoke with said her lifting restriction would disqualify 
her from employment, but Korrin told him the restriction was only 
temporary.36 
                                                 
28 Complaint at ¶8(a), EEOC v. Schofield Foods, Inc., d/b/a/ Quality Foods 
IGA, 2001 WL 34134856 (W.D.Wis. Sep. 26, 2001). 
29 Id. at ¶8(b). 
30 Id. at ¶8(c).  
31 Id. at ¶8; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 25, at *3-4. 
32 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 25, at *2. 
33 Id. at *2-3. 
34 Id. at *3.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. There was a dispute in the testimony over who told what to whom. 
Korrin insisted that she told the assistant manager that her lifting restriction was 
temporary; however, the assistant manager denied that Korrin said anything to him 
about the restriction being temporary.   
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After not hearing from Log Cabin for about a month, Korrin 
went back to the restaurant to check on her application.37 Korrin 
talked to the same assistant manager, who told her that the owner, who 
made all the hiring decisions, was out of town.38 Then, the assistant 
manger asked Korrin if she was the girl from Quality Foods, and 
Korrin confirmed that she had worked at Quality Foods.39 Korrin 
asked to see her application so she could add some additional 
experience, and when the assistant manager got it for her, the 
application had “HIV+” written across the front in big letters.40 Dean 
Lee, the owner of Log Cabin, never called or interviewed Korrin, and 
she never got the wa 41itressing job.     
                                                
 
B.  EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc. 
 
The owner of Log Cabin did go over Korrin’s application with the 
assistant manager, including the HIV notation.42 Lee said he decided 
not to hire Korrin because she lacked prior waitressing experience and 
because of her lifting restriction.43 However, at the time of Korrin’s 
application, Lee already had in his employ two waitresses with no 
prior waitressing experience and a waitress who could not do any 
heavy lifting.44 The EEOC filed suit, alleging that Log Cabin violated 
the ADA for not hiring Korrin “because it learned that she was HIV 
positive,” and Log Cabin subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that Korrin was not disabled nor qualified for the 
job.45  
 
 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. at *3-4. 
40 Id. at *4. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at *5. 
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1.  District Court Decision 
 
 The district court granted Log Cabin’s summary judgment 
motion, deciding that the EEOC had not proved Korrin had a 
disability.46 Although Korrin actually had AIDS, the complaint only 
spoke of having HIV, and it was not until the EEOC responded to Log 
Cabin’s motion for summary judgment that the EEOC’s affidavits 
discussed how AIDS or HIV/AIDS affected Korrin’s life activities.47 
The court concluded that calling Korrin’s condition AIDS was a 
“gross departure” from the original complaint that identified her as 
HIV positive, and that the EEOC could not be permitted to amend it 
pleadings “to allege an entirely new cause of action” when the trial “is 
only a month away.”48 Thus, because the court determined that 
“[h]aving AIDS and being HIV positive are not synonymous,” the 
only question before it was whether Log Cabin discriminated against 
Korrin because she had HIV, and the EEOC had not presented any 
evidence showing how HIV alone impacted Korrin’s life activities.49 
 Additionally, the district court ruled that even if an AIDS claim 
had been brought properly, there was no evidence that Log Cabin 
knew Korrin suffered from AIDS.50 Finally, the district court noted 
that it was “questionable” whether the EEOC could prove that Korrin 
was a qualified individual with a disability since she was unable to lift 
more than 10 pounds.51 The EEOC appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 
 
2.  Seventh Circuit Majority Opinion 
 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on 
slightly different grounds.52 The court reasoned that summary 
                                                 
46 EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 436 F.Supp.2d 992, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2006).  
47 Id. at 995. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 996. 
52 EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438, 440 (7th Cir. 2008).  
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judgment was appropriate because the “EEOC’s failed attempt to 
substitute factual premises left an empty record on whether [Korrin]’s 
HIV infection limited one or more of her major life activities.”53 
Stating that it need not address whether HIV and AIDS are 
synonymous for purposes under the ADA in this case, the Seventh 
Circuit found the district court’s judgment to be “manifestly 
reasonable” in refusing to “entertain the EEOC’s belated alteration of 
the factual basis of its claim.”54 
Citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,55 Judge Sykes, writing 
for the majority, stated that for a disability determination the ADA 
requires an individualized inquiry into whether a particular physical or 
mental impairment substantially limits the major life activities of a 
particular individual.56 According to Judge Sykes, the EEOC 
complicated this individualized inquiry by attempting to refashion its 
claim from one based on HIV to one based on AIDS.57  
Judge Sykes elaborated on the alleged distinction between 
AIDS and HIV by discussing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Bragdon v. Abbott,58 in which a pre-symptomatic HIV-infected 
woman brought an ADA claim when her dentist refused to fill her 
cavity unless she agreed to the work being performed at a hospital and 
agreed to pay for the cost of the hospital’s facilities.59 In determining 
whether the claimant was disabled, the Court held that her HIV 
satisfied the statutory definition of impairment and concluded that her 
infection substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction.60  
The Supreme Court, in Bragdon, described the typical 
progression of HIV, from its initial stage until it develops into full-
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 443. 
55 527 U.S. 471, 483. 
56 Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 442. 
57 Id. 
58 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
59 Id. at 628-29. 
60 Id. 
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blown AIDS.61 These different stages are important, said Judge Sykes, 
because the ADA’s applicability depends upon whether the asserted 
impairment is a disability within the meaning of the statute, which in 
turn depends on whether the impairment substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of the claimant.62 Accordingly, 
“whether an ADA claimant was HIV-positive or had full-blown AIDS 
at the time of the alleged discrimination is highly relevant to this 
foundational aspect of the claim.”63  
Judge Sykes noted that “being HIV-positive is not the same as 
having AIDS, as the Supreme Court discusses at length in Bragdon. 
And that’s the material point as to notice here.”64 Thus, because the 
district court and Log Cabin (allegedly) did not know until a month 
before trial that the EEOC was basing its disability discrimination 
claim on the fact that Korrin had AIDS, not just that she was HIV 
positive, this was a major alteration of the claim and the grounds upon 
which it rested.65 When Korrin and the EEOC submitted affidavits 
from her doctor describing the effect of AIDS, not HIV, on her life 
activities, the court had no choice but to conclude that the EEOC had 
not made a threshold evidentiary showing that HIV infection imposed 
substantial limitations on a major life activity.66 Based on Bragdon 
and Sutton, holding that the question of disability under the ADA is an 
individualized inquiry, the Seventh Circuit declined to adopt a rule 
that HIV infection is a per se disability.67 
                                                 
61 Id. at 635. 
62 Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 443. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 444.  
65 Id. at 443-44. It is worth noting that the EEOC’s response to Log Cabin’s 
summary judgment motion, including her doctor’s affidavits, was submitted only a 
month before trial because of a mistake by Log Cabin, who failed to properly serve 
the EEOC with its motion for summary judgment until well past the court’s deadline 
for filing dispositive motions. Due to that mistake, the district court was forced to 
revise its entire briefing schedule. Id. at 448, n. 1 (Williams, J. dissenting). 
66 Id. at 444-45. 
67 Id. at 445. 
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As an additional or alternative basis to affirm Log Cabin’s 
motion for summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Korrin 
was not a qualified individual under the ADA.68 The waitress position 
at Lee’s Log Cabin Restaurant required individuals “to lift, transport, 
and carry objects weighing from 25 to 30 pounds up to 20 or more 
times per shift.”69 Because Korrin indicated on her employment 
application that she had a lifting restriction of 10 pounds that could not 
be accommodated,70 she could not be considered “an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such 
individual holds or desires.”71   
Finally, after considering the EEOC’s petition for panel 
rehearing and for rehearing en banc, a majority of the Seventh Circuit 
judges voted to deny rehearing.72 
 
3.  The Dissents 
 
Judge Williams wrote not one, but two, dissents in EEOC v. 
Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc. She dissented from the majority view in the 
Seventh Circuit decision, and she wrote another opinion, in which 
Judges Rovner, Wood, and Evans joined, dissenting from the denial of 
the petition for rehearing. Judge Williams claimed that distinguishing 
between HIV or AIDS or HIV/AIDS “misses the point of the ADA.”73 
She argued that the EEOC did not change its claim because a person 
diagnosed with AIDS is also HIV positive. “To the extent there is a 
difference between HIV and AIDS . . . , the majority’s focus on 
                                                 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
72 EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438 (2008), rehearing denied, No. 06-
3278 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009). 
73 Id. at 447 (Williams, J. dissenting).  
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nomenclature overlooks whether that difference is consequential in 
this case.”74  
Citing to Bragdon, Sutton and Kirkingburg, Judge Williams 
concluded that the determination of whether an individual has a 
disability is not necessarily based on the name of the impairment, but 
rather on the impact of that impairment on the life of the individual.75 
Like the majority, Judge Williams pointed to the detailed description 
the Supreme Court in Bragdon makes of the illness’ progression for a 
person who is HIV-positive.76 However, she emphasized that Bragdon 
does not characterize AIDS as distinct from being HIV-positive.77 
Instead, the Supreme Court’s analysis, she said, breaks down the 
course of illness into three stages—the final stage being AIDS—but  
HIV is a disease that can render a person disabled at all stages.78  
In Judge Williams’ dissent from the denial of rehearing en 
banc, she argued that the majority imposed a higher pleading 
requirement for claims with multi-stage disabilities.79 The EEOC met 
its threshold burden pursuant to the federal notice pleading standard by 
providing a short and plain statement of the grievance: Log Cabin 
refused to hire Korrin because it found out she was HIV positive.80 
“The exact stage of HIV is a detail—and an irrelevant one at that.”81 
As required by this standard, any facts consistent with the allegations 
could be proved later without needing an amended complaint.82 
However, the majority speculated that the reason the EEOC did 
not plead AIDS in its complaint is because there was no evidence Log 
                                                 
74 Id. at 448.  
75 Id. at 447; see Bragdon, supra note 58 at 637; Sutton, supra note 13 at 483; 
Kirkingburg, supra note 13 at 566.  
76 EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438, 448 (2008), rehearing denied, No. 
06-3278 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009). 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438 (2008), rehearing denied, No. 06-
3278 at *4 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009). 
80 Id. at *8. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at *5. 
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Cabin knew Korrin had AIDS.83 Whether this is true, Judge Williams 
said in dissent, is not the issue. Log Cabin knew Korrin was HIV-
positive, and requiring employers to have specific knowledge of the 
actual extent of a disability goes beyond the pleading requirements.84 
The majority’s holding, Judge Williams concludes, “creates an 
insurmountable hurdle for ADA plaintiffs with complex disabilities” 
and raises serious questions about the conceptualization of disability in 
this country. 85  
 
III. CONCEPTS OF DISABILITY IN FEDERAL LAW 
 
A.  A Short History of the Concept of Disability in America 
 
Disabled people have been out of the mainstream of 
American life for two hundred years. And these years have 
seen the construction of modern American society—its 
values, its heritage, its cities, its transportation and 
communications networks. So that now, when they are 
coming back into our society, the barriers they face are 
enormous.86 
 
 The concept of disability in America has gone through a slow, 
painful change over the last 200 years. In colonial America, people 
with disabilities were viewed with both revulsion and pity.87 
Gradually, as medical technology advanced, disabled people were seen 
as objects of rehabilitation and cure.88 The government’s relationship 
to people with disabilities reflected public perception and attitudes of 
                                                 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at *7. 
85 Id. at *3, *6. 
86 FRANK BOWE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA (Harper & Row, 1978). 
87 Examples of ridicule, torture, imprisonment, and execution of disabled 
people throughout history are not uncommon, while societal practices of isolation 
and segregation have been the rule. BOWE, supra note 86, at 3-8. 
88 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 94. 
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the time: disabled people were viewed first in terms of their 
dependency and later in terms of their capacity for rehabilitation.89   
In the 18th century, the disabled were lumped together with 
widows and orphans, the poor, the elderly, the mentally ill, and others 
who could not provide for themselves and relied on community 
support.90 For those who had no family support, the government 
provided subsistence by establishing “poor laws” and paying private 
individuals to take in the disabled and provide room, board, and 
care.91 By the 1820s, the familial and community construct of society 
was changing and people with disabilities found much less local 
support.92 The government responded by constructing large 
almshouses that took in the disabled, along with juvenile delinquents, 
prostitutes, the elderly, an 93d the poor.    
                                                
The almshouses continued to grow throughout the 1800s, 
despite their reputation for deplorable conditions, and people with 
disabilities continued to share them with abandoned children, drifters, 
petty criminals and poor immigrants.94 The assumption with regard to 
people with disabilities was an inability to function effectively in 
society. Hence, the disabled were excluded and kept outside the 
mainstream of society, first to protect the disabled from society95 and 
later to protect society from the disabled.96 
 
89 Id. 
90 DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND 
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 4 (Aldine Transaction 2002) (1971).  
91 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF 
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 18 (1983) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM]. 
92 ROTHMAN, supra note 48, at 4-5. 
93 ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91. 
94 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 95.  
95 ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 19. “This philosophy 
emphasized ‘benevolent shelter’ and resulted in large institutions housing greater 
numbers of disabled people far from population centers.” Id. 
96 For example, a 1934 article in a Kentucky law journal calling for a 
sterilization statute in Kentucky issued the following warning: 
Since time immemorial, the criminal and defective have been the “cancer 
of society.” Strong, intelligent, useful families are becoming smaller and 
smaller; while irresponsible, diseased, defective families are becoming 
larger. The result can only be race degeneration. To prevent this race 
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The early 20th century saw a shift in society’s perception of 
people with disabilities. The basic principle was that a disability is an 
infirmity that could be fixed or cured.97 Disabled people must be 
rehabilitated and returned to gainful employment to increase national 
production and decrease welfare spending.98 At the end of World War 
I, a mass of injured returning war veterans prompted Congress to 
establish laws governing the rehabilitation of individuals with 
disabilities.99 The Smith-Sears Veterans’ Rehabilitation Act was 
enacted in 1918 “to provide for vocational rehabilitation and return to 
civil employment of disabled persons discharged from the military or 
naval forces.”100 Two years later, the Smith-Fess Act was signed into 
law as the first federal civil vocational rehabilitation act for individuals 
with disabilities who were not war veterans.101  
This conception of disability was termed the medical model of 
disability, as opposed to the exclusionary model of earlier years.102 
The medical model presumed that the problem of disability was within 
the individual, who must change to fit the surrounding society, rather 
than any aspect of the environment changing to make life easier for the 
disabled individual.103 The definition of disability at this time focused 
on the impact an individual’s disability had on his or her capacity to 
work, and on the extent to which such an individual would benefit 
from vocational rehabilitation programs.104 For those individuals who 
                                                                                                                   
suicide we must prevent the socially inadequate persons from propagating 
their kind, i.e., the feebleminded, epileptic, insane, criminal, diseased, and 
other.  
Note, “A Sterilization Statute for Kentucky,” KY. L.J., vol. 23 (1934), at 168, 
cited in ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 20 n. 23. 
97 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SHARING THE DREAM: IS THE ADA 
ACCOMMODATING ALL? 6 (2000) (hereinafter SHARING THE DREAM). 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918) (amended 1919). 
101 Smith-Fess Act, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (repealed 1973, and re-enacted 
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355). 
102 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 96. 
103 Id.  
104 The Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954 defined “physically 
handicapped individual” to mean “any individual who is under a physical or mental 
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could not work, Congress established Social Security Disability 
Insurance (“SSDI”)105 and the Supplemental Security Income program 
(“SSI”) to provide support for disabled individuals.106 To qualify as 
disabled and receive cash benefits under both of these programs, an 
individual must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment.”107  
As the modern civil rights movement in America gained 
momentum, protections against disability discrimination also became 
part of the discussion.108 The courts became involved in mostly 
unsuccessful attempts to remedy disability discrimination.109 For 
example, in 1965 a New York City schoolteacher sued the state public 
school system when he was excluded from a teaching position because 
of his blindness.110 The court held that the school board was 
authorized to disqualify teaching applicants based on vision 
requirements.111 However, in 1969, a court in Utah applied the 
principles of equal educational opportunity established in Brown v. 
Board of Education112 to people with disabilities, holding that the 
exclusion of two mentally retarded children from the state’s public 
schools was unconstitutional.113 This decision started a landslide of 
lawsuits alleging disability discrimination in transportation, housing, 
                                                                                                                   
disability which constitutes a substantial handicap to employment, but which is of 
such a nature that vocational rehabilitation services may reasonably be expected to 
render him fit to engage in remunerative occupation.” Pub. L. No. 565, § 11(b), 68 
Stat. 652, 660 (1954).  
105 Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880 § 103(a), 70 Stat. 
807, 815-24 (1956). 
106 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 
(1972). 
107 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994) (SSDI); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994) 
(SSI). 
108 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 97. 
109 SHARING THE DREAM, supra note 97, at 6. 
110 Chavich v. Bd. Of Exam’rs, 23 A.D.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965). 
111Id. at 60-61.  
112 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
113 Wolf v. State Legislature, Civ. No. 182646 (3d Judicial Dist., Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Jan. 8, 1969).  
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medical services, contracts, voting, and confinement in residential 
treatment facilities.114 A new attitude towards the disabled began to 
develop that continued the rehabilitation model of disability but also 
sought to protect the civil rights of disabled people.115 
 
B.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
 
Too many handicapped Americans are not served at all, too 
many lack jobs, and too many are underemployed—utilized 
in capacities well below the levels of their training, 
education, and ability . . . [I]f we are to assure that all 
handicapped persons may participate fully in the rewards 
made possible by the vocational rehabilitation program, we 
must devote more of our energy toward elimination of the 
most disgraceful barrier of all—discrimination.116  
 
 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not address 
disability discrimination, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973117 was 
eventually signed into law and took a significant step toward 
implementing a national policy to integrate people with disabilities 
into society.118 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act119 provides that 
                                                 
114 SHARING THE DREAM, supra note 97, at 6 (citing ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., 
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau 
of National Affairs, 1995)). 
115 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 97. 
116 119 Cong. Rec. 24, 587 (1973). Senator Taft (R-Ohio), a sponsor of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, speaking in support of the Act (cited in 
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 49).  
117 29 U.S.C. § 790 (repealed 1992).  
118 ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 47. 
119 The remaining sections of the Rehabilitation Act also sought to further equal 
rights for disabled individuals: Section 501 requires affirmative action hiring and 
advancement programs for federal agencies (29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. IV 1998)), 
Section 503 has similar requirements for federal governmental contractors with 
$10,000 or more in federal contracts (29 U.S.C. § 793(a)), and Section 502 
established the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access 
Board), which issued guidelines for accessible designs and a uniform set of 
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“no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United 
States. . .shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance.”120 Section 504 was patterned on nearly identical 
provisions in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting 
discrimination based on race in any program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance, and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, prohibiting discrimination based on sex in any 
educational program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance.121  
In 1974, Congress expanded the definition of “handicapped 
individual” for purposes of Section 504 to read as follows: any person 
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits 
one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of 
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an 
impairment.122 The amended definition reflected Congress’ concern 
with protecting the disabled against discrimination stemming not only 
from simple prejudice, but also from “archaic attitudes and laws” that 
proliferated because the American people were simply unfamiliar with 
and insensitive to the difficulties confronting individuals with 
disabilities.123  
While the act declined to define “substantially limits” or 
“major life activities,” the act’s regulations gave a non-exhaustive list 
of examples of impairments, including “orthopedic, visual, speech, 
and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular 
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental 
retardation, emotional illness, and. . .drug and alcohol addiction”; and 
examples of major life activities, including “functions such as caring 
                                                                                                                   
standards for building accessibility pursuant to the act’s requirements (29 U.S.C. 
§ 792(a),(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998)).  
120 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998) (cited in Feldblum, supra note 4, at 98-99). 
121 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 99. 
122 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) 
123 S. Rep. No. 93-1297, p. 50 (1974) (cited in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. at 279). 
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for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”124  
In an important 1979 Supreme Court case, a woman was fired 
from her job as a schoolteacher because she had several lapses of 
tuberculosis.125 The issues that the Court decided were whether the 
definition of a handicapped individual included people with 
contagious diseases and whether the ability to transmit a contagious 
disease could ever be considered a handicap under Section 504.126 The 
Court found that the schoolteacher was a handicapped individual 
under Section 504127 because, as the Court explained: 
 
We do not agree with petitioners that, in defining a 
handicapped individual under § 504, the contagious effects of 
a disease can be meaningfully distinguished from the 
disease’s physical effects on a claimant in a case such as this. 
[The schoolteacher’s] contagiousness and her physical 
impairment each resulted from the same underlying 
condition, tuberculosis. It would be unfair to allow an 
employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of 
a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient 
and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment.128 
 
The Court did not spend much time analyzing whether a particular 
impairment sufficiently qualifies as a disability, instead focusing 
primarily on the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability.129 
By providing a broad interpretation of this prong, the Court 
acknowledged Congress’ finding that society’s myths and fears about 
                                                 
124 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2007); 28 C.F.R § 41.31 (b)(2) (2007).  
125 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
126 The Supreme Court also considered whether the schoolteacher was 
qualified for the job, but the Court determined further findings of fact were needed 
before that question could be answered. Id. at 288-89.  
127 Id. at 284.  
128 Id. at 282. 
129 Id. at 284. 
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disability “are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow 
from actual impairment.”130 In fact, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the “regarded as” prong seemed sufficiently broad to 
capture any individual who had been discriminated against because of 
any impairment 131.  
                                                
 When analyzing historical perceptions of disability, the judicial 
interpretations and the agency implementations of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 become significant because Congress used the same 
defining language in both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.132 
Indeed, many in Congress viewed the ADA as merely an extension to 
the private sector of the public sector requirements already found in 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.133 Because Congress felt 
comfortable with the manner in which the definition of disability had 
been applied thus far, and because disability rights advocates felt 
comfortable that the same individuals who had been covered under 
existing disability anti-discrimination law would be covered under the 
new law, the definition of disability in the ADA was taken directly 
from the definition in the Rehabilitation Act.134 Such repetition 
demonstrates Congress’ sanctioning of this broad interpretation and 
implementation, which it endorsed and incorporated into the ADA. 
  
C.  Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 
[The ADA] signals the end to the unjustified segregation and 
exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of 
American life. As the Declaration of Independence has been a 
beacon for people all over the world seeking freedom, it is 
my hope that the Americans with Disabilities Act will 
 
130 Id.  
131 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 92 (emphasis added). 
132 Id. at 128. 
133 Id. at 92. 
134 Id. 
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likewise come to be a model for the choices and opportunities 
of future generations around the world.135 
 
On July 26, 1990, a day that President George H.W. Bush 
likened to another “independence day,”136 the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990137 was signed into law. This Act, he said, 
would allow the 43 million Americans with disabilities to “pass 
through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality, 
independence, and freedom.”138 The ADA was the world's first 
comprehensive civil rights law for people with disabilities,139 
prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities in 
employment (Title I),140 in public services (Title II),141 in public 
accommodations (Title III)142 and in telecommunications (Title IV).143 
Acknowledging that an ever increasing population of 
Americans was physically or mentally disabled,144 Congress addressed 
the discrimination against individuals with disabilities by establishing 
a “clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”145 According to 
the ADA, “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an 
individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
                                                 
135 President George Bush, Statement Upon Signing S. 933, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
601, 602 (1990). 
136 President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1067, 1067 (July 26, 1990), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html.  
137 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
138 Bush, supra note 136.  
139 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA): 1990-2002, http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/ (last modified Oct. 15, 
2002).  
140 42 U.S.C. § 12111–12117. 
141 Id. § 12131–12165. 
142 Id. § 12181–12189. 
143 47 U.S.C. § 225. 
144 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1). 
145 Id. § 12101 (5)(1). 
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record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”146  
Therefore, to be considered disabled under section (A) of the 
ADA, a person must (1) have an impairment (2) that substantially 
limits (3) a major life activity. However, as with the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, Congress did not define the terms “physical or mental 
impairment” or “major life activities,” leaving it to the EEOC and 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to issue regulations and the courts to 
apply them.147 Further, the ADA regulations adopted the same non-
exhaustive list of major life activities148 as found in Section 504 the 
Rehabilitation Act, and Congress specifically ordered the courts not to 
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under the 
Rehabilitation Act or its regulations to ensure that the ADA’s 
regulations and jurisprudence were not eroded by the courts.149 
The ADA regulations issued by the DOJ were very similar to 
the comparable Section 504 regulations, including an almost identical 
definition of disability.150 Nothing in the DOJ’s regulations suggested 
that courts would need to engage in an individual assessment with 
regard to most impairments to determine if a particular individual had 
a disability.151 In contrast, the EEOC regulations introduced, for the 
first time in disability jurisprudence, the idea of an individualized 
assessment to determine whether a person had a disability under the 
ADA.152 Also for the first time, the EEOC defined the term 
“substantially limits”153 and set forth factors to be considered when 
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major 
life activity.154 Such a determination, the EEOC noted, must be made 
                                                 
146 Id. at § 12102 (2). 
147 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 134.   
148 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007). 
149 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2007). 
150 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 134.   
151 Id. at 135. 
152 Id. 
153 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1999). 
154 Id. at § 1630.2(j)(2). 
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on a case by case basis, “without regard to mitigating measures such 
as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.”155 
Sections (B) and (C) of the ADA definition of disability also 
come directly from the language of the Rehabilitation Act and reflect 
Congress’ desire to prohibit discrimination based not only on an actual 
disability, but also on a history of disability or the perception of 
disability.156 
 
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
UNDER THE ADA 
 
A.  Supreme Court Decisions 
 
1. Bragdon v. Abbott (1998) 
 
The Supreme Court’s only decision on what constitutes a major 
life activity within the context of HIV/AIDS is Bragdon v. Abbott.157 
Abbott, an asymptomatic HIV positive woman, went to see Bragdon 
for a dental appointment.158  When the dentist became aware of her 
HIV status, he refused to fill her cavity in his office and told her he 
would only perform the procedure at a hospital and if she bore the 
additional expenses.159 Abbott brought suit under Section 12182(a) of 
the ADA,160 and the Court granted certiorari to review “whether HIV 
infection is a disability under the ADA when the infection has not yet 
progressed to the so-called symptomatic phase.”161 The Court had 
                                                 
155 Id. 
156 See Arline, 48 U.S. at 284 (discussing Congress’ pre-ADA concern about 
perceived impairments).  
157 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
158 Id. at 628. 
159 Id. at 629. 
160 “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who . . . 
operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
161 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628. 
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little trouble concluding that because of its effect on the hemic and 
lymphatic systems from the moment of infection, HIV satisfies the 
definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the 
disease.162 Considering reproduction to be a major life activity, the 
Court then found that HIV infection had a personal, individual effect 
on Abbott’s life, deterring her from reproducing.163 The Court 
concluded that Abbott’s HIV infection qualified as a disability under 
the ADA because it substantially limited the major life activity of 
reproduction.164  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined to address the issue of 
whether HIV is a per se disability under the ADA, limiting the 
decision’s guidance for lower courts and leaving the door open to 
discrimination against those who are not able to reproduce or have no 
intention to reproduce.165  
 
2.  The Sutton Trilogy (1999) 
 
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. and its companion cases,166 the 
Supreme Court addressed the major life activity prong of the disability 
definition.  The Court announced a new standard, which required that 
the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity must be balanced against the “ameliorative effects 
of mitigation measures,” such as medication or medical devices.167 In 
Sutton, twin sisters with severe myopia were denied the opportunity to 
become commercial airline pilots because they did not meet the 
airline’s minimum vision requirement, which was uncorrected visual 
acuity of 20/100 or better.168 Although the sisters’ uncorrected vision 
                                                 
162 Id. at 637. 
163 Id. at 641. 
164 Id.   
165 Id. at 642. 
166 527 U.S. at 471 (1999); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555; Murphy v. United 
Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
167 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. 
168 Id. at 475.  
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was 20/200 in the right eye and 20/400 in the left eye, with the use of 
corrective measures, both could function identically to individuals 
without a similar impairment.169  
The Court carefully parsed the language of the ADA’s definition 
of disability and held that because the definition uses the “present 
indicative verb form,” a person must be presently, not potentially or 
hypothetically, substantially limited.170 Since the sisters’ impairment 
could be mitigated by corrective measures and thus was no longer 
substantially limiting, the sisters were not disabled under the ADA.171  
Likewise, in Murphy v. United Parcel Service, a case decided the 
same day, the Court upheld Murphy’s termination because his 
hypertension was controlled by medication.172 Murphy was hired as a 
mechanic, which also required him to drive commercial vehicles.173 
However, when a medical supervisor reviewed his blood pressure 
tests, Murphy was fired on the belief that his blood pressure exceeded 
the Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) requirements for drivers 
of commercial motor vehicles.174 Murphy filed suit under Title I of the 
ADA.175 Given its holding in Sutton, the Supreme Court affirmed that 
with his medication, Murphy functioned normally in everyday 
activities, and thus he was not a person with a disability under the 
ADA.176 
Finally, in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,177 the last of the Sutton 
trilogy, the Supreme Court declared that the mitigating measures 
                                                 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 482. 
171 Id. at 482-83.  
172 527 U.S. at 519. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 520. 
175 Id. at 518. “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(a). 
176 Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. 
177 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
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standard applied not just to artificial corrective measures, but also to 
“measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body’s 
own system.”178 Kirkingburg, a monocular individual,179 was fired 
from his job as a truck driver because he could not meet the basic 
DOT vision standard, and Kirkingburg sued under the ADA.180  
While allowing that most monocular individuals would ordinarily 
be considered disabled under the ADA, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Kirkingburg did not qualify.181 Kirkingburg’s brain had developed 
subconscious mechanisms for coping with his monocularity and thus 
his body compensated for his disability.182 The Court held that the 
ADA “requires monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act’s 
protection, to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of 
the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth 
perception and visual field, is substantial.”183 Thus, because his body 
had learned a way to make his impairment less limiting, Kirkingburg 
could not be disabled and was not protected under the ADA.  
 
3.  Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002) 
 
The Supreme Court continued its trend of interpreting disability 
narrowly, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams,184 by holding that the term “major life activities” “refers to 
those activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
life.”185 The Court went on to say that under the ADA, this term 
needed to be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for 
                                                 
178 Id. at 555-56. 
179 Kirkingburg suffers from amblyopia, a general medical term for “poor 
vision caused by abnormal visual development secondary to abnormal visual 
stimulation” Id. at 559, n 3 (citing K. Wright et al., Pediatric Ophthalmology and 
Strabismus 126 (1995)). 
180 Id. at 560. 
181 Id. at 567. 
182 Id. at 565-66. 
183 Id. at 567 (emphasis added).  
184 534 U.S. at 184. 
185 Id. at 198. 
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qualifying as disabled.”186 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Williams 
worked on an engine fabrication assembly line using pneumatic tools, 
which eventually caused her to develop painful medical conditions of 
the muscles and nerves, including carpal tunnel syndrome, 
myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet compression.187 After her 
employment was terminated, Williams filed a charge of disability 
discrimination, alleging her employer failed to reasonably 
accommodate her disability.188  
In substantiating her claim of disability, Williams said that her 
physical impairments substantially limited her in (1) manual tasks; (2) 
housework; (3) gardening; (4) playing with her children; (5) lifting; 
and (6) working.189 To be substantially limited in performing manual 
tasks, the Supreme Court found, an individual must have an 
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from 
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives, and the impairment’s impact must be permanent or long term.190 
The Court emphasized the need for an individualized assessment of 
the effect of an impairment, especially when the impairment is one 
that varies from person to person.191 Repeating the findings of the 
Sutton trilogy, the Court said that it is not enough to submit evidence 
of a medical diagnosis of an impairment; instead, for a claimant to 
prove a disability requires offering evidence that, in terms of the 
individual’s own experience, the extent of the limitation is 
substantial.192  
Finally, with the regard to what may be considered a manual task, 
the Supreme Court held that “the manual tasks unique to any particular 
job are not necessarily important parts of most people’s lives. As a 
result, occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to 
                                                 
186 Id. at 197. 
187 Id. at 187, 196. 
188 Id. at 190. 
189 Id.  
190 Id. at 198.  
191 Id. at 199. 
192 Id. at 198; see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 566. 
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the manual task inquiry.”193 Rather, the inquiry should focus the 
variety of tasks central to most people’s daily lives, e.g., tending to 
personal hygiene and carrying out personal or household chores.194 
Because there was evidence that Williams was able to perform these 
types of tasks,195 her limitations did not establish a manual task 
disability as a matter of law.196  
The Supreme Court also emphasized that courts should not 
engage in hypothetical inquiries as to the severity of impairments but 
must focus instead on the individual in her present state.197 In other 
words, the Supreme Court requires an individualized inquiry and 
rejects the notion of per se disability under the ADA. 
 
V. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AMENDMENTS ACT 
 
A. Has Anything Changed? 
 
 Although the ADAAA starts with essentially the same three-
pronged definition of disability that existed under the original ADA,198 
the primary purpose of the ADAAA is to broaden the definition of the 
term disability and make it easier for individuals to qualify for the 
law’s protections.199 Section 2(b)(5) of the ADAAA expressly states 
that the determination of whether an individual has a disability “should 
not demand extensive analysis”;200 while Section 3(4)(A) provides 
that the definition of disability “shall be construed in favor of broad 
coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent 
                                                 
193 Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002), superseded 
by statute, ADAAA of 2008. 
194 Id. at 192. 
195 Id. at 201-02. 
196 The Supreme Court did not consider the working, lifting, or other 
arguments for disability status that had been preserved below but which were not 
ruled upon by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 193.  
197 Id. at 198. 
198 See supra note 15. 
199 ADAA of 2008, supra note 9, § 2(b). 
200 Id. at § 2(b)(5). 
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permitted by the terms of this Act.”201 These sections are consistent 
with the broad interpretation of disability found in Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the broad view enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.202  
 Section 3 of the ADAAA expands the definition of “major life 
activities” and provides two non-exhaustive lists as examples. The first 
list includes previously recognized activities, as well as three new 
ones: reading, bending, and communicating.203 The second non-
exhaustive list clarifies that major life activities include activities that 
constitute the operation of a major bodily function, including but not 
limited to “functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, 
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, 
endocrine, and reproductive functions.”204  
 Although proof that an individual has an impairment will not 
be sufficient by itself to establish that the individual has a disability, 
Section 2(b)(5) states that “the primary object of attention in cases 
brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the 
ADA have complied with their obligations, and. . .the question of 
whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA 
should not demand extensive analysis.”205 This change expresses a 
lower standard than the Supreme Court’s strict and demanding 
                                                 
201 Id. § 3(4)(A). 
202 29 U.S.C. § 790 (repealed 1992).; Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Airline, 
480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
203 The first list in its entirety includes “caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 
ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, at § 3(2)(A). However, on April 6, 2009, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to accept a petition by a fired oil field safety worker to 
reverse an appeals court ruling that driving is not a “major life activity” under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. Kellogg v. Energy Safety Servs. Inc., d/b/a Oilind 
Safety, U.S., No. 08-1013, cert. denied (Apr. 6, 2009). 
204 ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, § 3(2)(B). For example, cancer would 
affect an individual’s major bodily function of normal cell growth, kidney disease 
would affect bladder function, and HIV would affect functioning of the immune 
system. 
205 Id. at § 2(b)(5). 
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standard found in the Sutton trilogy and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing.206 
 The ADAAA further provides that “[a]n impairment that is 
episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a 
major life activity when active.”207 In the past, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that courts should refrain from hypothetical inquiries as to 
the severity of impairments and instead must focus on the individual in 
his or her present state.208 However, with these changes, courts must 
consider whether an impairment would substantially limit a major life 
activity if it were active.  
 In Section 3(4)(E)(i), the ADAAA states that ameliorative 
effects of mitigating measures, other than ordinary eyeglasses or 
contact lenses, shall not be considered when assessing whether an 
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.209 This 
reversal of the analysis set forth in the Sutton trilogy goes on to 
provide that if an employer uses a qualification standard based on an 
individual’s uncorrected vision, the employer must show that the 
standard is related to the job and consistent with a business 
necessity.210 
 One of the most significant changes to the ADA involves the 
“regarded as” prong of the original definition. According to the 
“Findings and Purposes” section of the ADAAA, one of the purposes 
of the amendments is “to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. . .which set forth a broad 
view of the third prong of the definition of [disability] under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”211 The ADAAA sets forth a separate 
definition of the “regarded as” prong: 
 An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded 
as having such an impairment” if the individual establishes 
                                                 
206 See supra note 13. 
207 ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, at § 4(a). 
208 See e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482; Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198.  
209 ADA Amendments Act, supra note 9, § 3(4)(E)(i). 
210 Id. § 5(b). 
211 Id. § 2(b)(3). 
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the he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under 
this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is 
perceived to limit a major life activity.212 
 
Thus, the “regarded as” prong once again seems sufficiently broad to 
capture almost any individual who had been discriminated against 
because of almost any impairment.213 
 These are the most significant changes made to the definition 
of disability under the ADAAA. Other changes include a new 
provision concerning the duty of a covered entity to accommodate an 
individual that the covered entity regards as having a disability and an 
express statement concerning the authority of federal agencies to issue 
regulations concerning the definition of disability.214 
 
B. Log Cabin Redux 
 
 Had Korrin Krause Stewart’s case been decided just a few 
months later than it was, after the ADAAA had gone into effect, the 
outcome may have been quite different. The analysis of her claim of 
disability discrimination would have been looked at through a broader 
lens, where the focus would be on evaluating the merits of her claim, 
rather than on determining whether she met the definition of disability. 
 To bring a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, a 
plaintiff must show “(1) he is disabled; (2) he is qualified to perform 
the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable 
accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action 
because of his disability.”215 Contrary to the expectations of the ADA 
drafters, the courts began to interpret the first prong more and more 
strictly, creating a demanding standard for being considered 
                                                 
212 Id. at§ 4(a). 
213 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
214 Long, supra note 1, at 223. 
215 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
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disabled.216 Thus, claimants found, somewhat perversely, that a wide 
range of serious impairments did not meet the statutory definition of 
disability.217 With the passage of the ADAAA, however, getting past 
the first prong in bringing a disability discrimination claim will likely 
be less onerous.  
 For Korrin, who was not considered disabled because she did 
not make a sufficient showing of how HIV (rather than AIDS) 
substantially impaired any of her major life activities, being 
considered disabled now would arguably be much easier. Section 3 of 
the ADAAA clarifies that major life activities include activities that 
constitute the operation of a major bodily function, including functions 
of the immune system.218 Thus, Korrin’s HIV infection would qualify 
as substantially impairing a major life activity, and, in turn, she would 
be considered a disabled individual under the ADA.  
 However, the inquiry into Korrin’s disability discrimination 
claim does not stop there. She must now show that she is qualified to 
be a waitress at Log Cabin with or without reasonable accommodation 
and that she was not hired because she has HIV/AIDS. Will Korrin be 
successful in her claim? The answer is unclear until there is further 
investigation into the merits of her claim; but now at least, under the 
ADAAA, Korrin’s claim will reach the merits. 
 
C. The Future of the ADAAA 
 
What does the future hold for the ADAAA? Since the ADAAA 
went into effect on January 1, 2009, few cases have yet to be decided 
under the new amendments. A case filed on February 13, 2009, in the 
Ninth Circuit noted that while the court’s decision was pending, the 
ADAAA was signed into law.219 The court declined to consider 
whether the ADAAA applied retroactively in this case because even if 
                                                 
216 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 139.  
217 Id. 
218 ADAAA of 2008, supra note 9, at § 3(2)(B). 
219 Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 
850, 853 (2009).  
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the ADAAA were applicable, the claimant provided sufficient 
evidence that he was a qualified individual to survive summary 
judgment under pre-ADAAA law.220   
In a disability discrimination case in the Sixth Circuit, the court 
vacated the judgment and remanded the case “[b]ecause this suit for 
injunctive relief was pending on appeal when the amendments became 
effective, [and] the amendments apply to this case.”221 The plaintiff’s 
status under the ADA turned on the definition of “substantial 
limitation,” which changed under the ADAAA.222 Thus, the district 
court’s legal conclusions would have to be reconsidered in light of the 
new law.223 
An even more recent case in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois held that the court would apply the law 
in force when the events of the case occurred.224 Although the plaintiff 
argued that the ADAAA should apply because it restored Congress’ 
original intent that disability claims should be broadly construed, the 
court noted that the ADAAA “does not contain an express provision 
for retroactive application, and courts will not apply a statute to events 
preceding the effective date if doing so would cause a retroactive 
effect.”225 
Legal commentators are already discussing some of the 
controversial and potentially contentious issues brought about by the 
passage of the ADAAA. One article shows that the ADAAA fails to 
address certain important issues, including the so-called “single-job 
rule,” short-term impairments, the “record of” prong, whether 
interacting with others qualifies as a major life activity, and the limited 
                                                 
220 Id. 
221 Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638 
(C.A.6 (Ky.)) at *1.  
222 Id. at *2. 
223 Id.  
224 Pennie v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 07-C1596, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL 
855787, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2009).  
225 Id.  
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guidance provided on reasonable accommodations.226 Another 
commentator argues that “courts in employment discrimination cases 
often show surprising disregard for Congress’ disapproval of 
precedent.”227 Calling these repudiated precedents “shadow 
precedents,” the article suggests that Congress’ check on judicial 
power is not as robust as typically assumed because courts tend to rely 
on shadow precedents rather than interpret the new language of a 
congressional override.228  
Legal practitioners also are discussing the amendments and the 
future of the ADAAA. With titles such as “Recent Amendments to 
Federal Law Increase Protection for the Disabled,” “Disabling the 
ADAAA,” “The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Who Isn’t 
Disabled?” and “The New and Expanded Americans with Disabilities 
Act,” these articles discuss the changes to disability law and conclude 
generally that the efficacy of the ADAAA will only become clearer as 
more and more courts consider disability discrimination issues under 
the new statutory guidelines.229  
 
VI. A BETTER DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
 
Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom 
of the well and in the kingdom of the sick. Although we 
prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of 
                                                 
226 For a discussion of the unresolved issues under the ADAAA, see Long, 
supra note 1, at 226-29. 
227 Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 
582 (2009).  
228 Id. at 511.  
229 See generally Lynne M. Hook & Stacey A. Lee, Recent Amendments to 
Federal Law Increase Protection for the Disabled, LOS ANGELES LAW., FEB. 2009, 
AT 10.; Stephanie Wilson & E. David Krulewicz, Disabling the ADAAA, NJ LAW., 
Feb. 2009, at 37; Edward G. Phillips, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Who Isn’t 
Disabled?, TENN. BAR J., Feb. 2009, at 33; Sandra B. Reiss & J. Trent Scofield, The 
New and Expanded Americans with Disabilities Act, ALA. LAW.,  Jan. 2009, at 38.  
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us is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as 
citizens of that other place.230 
 
The rulings in cases such as the Sutton trilogy, Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing., and Log Cabin made it harder for people to prove that 
their impairments caused a substantial limitation in some life activity 
but at the same time did not make them unqualified for the jobs they 
sought.231 With the revisions made to the definition of disability and 
other significant changes under the ADAAA, fewer individuals will 
find themselves in this catch-22 situation of having to prove both 
substantial limitation and qualification for employment in order to 
bring a discrimination claim.  
However, even with the ADAAA’s insistence on a broad 
definition of disability, the law still seems to rest on the premise that 
anti-discrimination protection is necessary and appropriate for a 
limited group of individuals who are very different from “normal,” 
non-disabled people. Though much more subtle in ends and means 
than were historical perceptions of disability, the current perception of 
disability retains a clear dividing line between the disabled and the 
nondisabled. This disabled-nondisabled dichotomy “is the wellspring 
of [disability] discrimination.”232  
The drafters of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the 
disability rights activists who pushed for the ADA’s passage 
envisioned a very different picture of disability.233 In their vision, 
people with disabilities have a spectrum of impairments, from mild to 
moderate to severe.234 There is no dividing line between those with 
disabilities and those without, because anyone with an impairment, no 
matter how trivial or mild, could still be covered under this view if he 
or she was discriminated against.235 The one unifying aspect is that the 
                                                 
230 SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 3 (Picador, 1978).  
231 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 160. 
232 ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 93–94. 
233 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 161. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 161-62. 
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individual either has to have, or has to be perceived as having, an 
impairment, i.e., an aberration in a physical or mental system.236 
Unlike race and gender classes which include specific groups of 
people who will remain (mostly) in those exclusive groups, disabilities 
are nonexclusive: everyone is eligible to become disabled.237 
According to one commentator, “Most disabled people are 
adventitiously impaired. That is, they became disabled rather than 
being born that way.”238  
The Sutton case raised the question of whether people who 
wear glasses and contact lenses should be considered disabled under 
the ADA.239 While people with disabilities historically had been 
considered others or different from the rest of us, and to the extent that 
people with disabilities were traditionally perceived as unable to 
function in society, the twin sisters in Sutton brought disability anti-
discrimination law closer to home.240 If the disability issue before the 
Supreme Court concerned people with glasses and contact lenses, 
where was the line to be drawn?  
 Variously termed a range, a spectrum, or a continuum, under 
this view of disability, almost any person would be able to invoke the 
protection of the law.241 Imagine that everyone in society is on a 
continuum of impairments: at one side of the continuum are people 
with ingrown toenails; further along are people who wear glasses or 
have high blood pressure; even further along the continuum are people 
with cancer or diabetes or HIV infection; and at the far end of the 
continuum are people who are blind or use wheelchairs.242 For 
example, take the simplistic categorization of blind versus sighted. 
Vision is not one-dimensional, but involves a number of component 
                                                 
236 Id. at 162. 
237 Id. at 145.  
238 Bowe, supra note 44, at 34. 
239 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 153. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 101. 
242 Id. 
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functions, and for each function there is a range of abilities.243 At one 
end of the vision spectrum are a few people with unusually good 
eyesight, and at the other end are people who have no vision 
whatsoever. However, the vast majority of people fall somewhere 
between the two extremes of the vision continuum.244 “A similar 
continuum occurs for all of our physical and mental abilities. For each 
human function, there are some who excel, some who perform poorly, 
if at all, and some who perform at all levels in between.”245  
It would seem to make perfect sense, then, to consider, not the 
dichotomous classification of disabled versus non-disabled, but rather 
a spectrum of disability that includes everyone.  While the disability 
spectrum would result in the inclusion of a number of people who 
might never need the anti-discrimination protection of the ADA, it 
would in fact mirror Title VII, which similarly provides protection to 
people who might never its protection.246 Thus, a person with an 
ingrown toenail can prove she has an impairment, and hence is 
covered under the ADA, just as a man can prove he has a sex, and 
hence is covered under Title VII.247 Both individuals would then have 
to prove they were fired because of the impairment or the sex, 
respectively.248  
In reality, men are not usually fired because they are men, and 
women are not usually fired because they have ingrown toenails. 
However, as a matter of public policy, men should not be fired simply 
because they are men, and women should not be fired simply because 
they have ingrown toenails.249 Thus, even though neither Title VII nor 
the ADA were passed to combat the problems of discrimination 
against men or women with ingrown toenails, “the resultant protection 
against discrimination based on gender or impairment should be 
                                                 
243 ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 91, at 87. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 88. 
246 Feldblum, supra note 4, at 163. 
247 Id.  
248 Id.  
249 Id. at 163-64. 
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 290
equally available to any individual who has experienced 
discrimination on the basis of the identified component.”250 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin 
represents just how far the determination of what constitutes a disabled 
individual has moved away from the original vision of the ADA’s 
drafters and supporters. In an attempt to restore the ADA to its original 
purpose, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. 
Whether these amendments will produce dramatic changes in the way 
the administrative agencies and courts apply the ADA remains to be 
seen. Nonetheless, the real test of the amendments efficacy will be the 
manner in which they help break down the myths, stereotypes, and 
fears surrounding the concept of disability that continues today.  
                                                 
250 Id. at 164. 
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